Germany First: Merz’s plans to rebrand German foreign policy

Commentary by Malina Wiethaus
27 February 2024

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared a Zeitenwende, an epochal shift in the international global order and Germany’s foreign policy. However, for Friedrich Merz, the chancellor candidate for the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), this shift does not go far enough. During the election campaign, Merz positioned his incoming foreign policy as an Epochenbruch, an epochal rupture. For him, a decisive break from the status quo is long overdue. He argues that the previous government, the so-called ‘traffic light’ coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Green Party, and the neoliberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), tarnished Germany’s reputation on the global stage (Merz, 2025). Despite lacking any prior experience in government—whether at the federal or state level—Merz carries himself with a statesmanlike demeanor and the confidence of a seasoned leader. His extensive finance and corporate law background, which led to prominent boardroom roles at several international firms and reportedly amassed considerable wealth, now shapes his pragmatic and business-oriented approach to foreign policy (Parker, 2025). Merz’s ambition is unequivocal: to rebrand Germany’s foreign policy and transform the country from what he calls a “sleeping middle power” into a “leading middle power” (Merz, 2025).

How does a CDU-led government plan to achieve this? The election results indicate that the only feasible coalition option excluding the right-wing AfD is a return to the so-called grand coalition, an alliance between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. Should coalition negotiations falter, Merz, who is poised to become Germany’s next chancellor, would face a difficult choice: either secure the chancellorship with support from the AfD—a move he has repeatedly vowed to avoid—or call for new elections. The CDU candidate strives to shift away from the greens-led value-driven foreign policy of the previous government, advocating instead for a strategy grounded in economic pragmatism. For Merz, foreign policy must be effective, efficient, and transactional – focused on the economy rather than ideology. In his view, this pragmatic approach to foreign policy should be driven exclusively by German interests. While these interests may frequently align with those of the European Union (EU), he acknowledges that this will not always be the case (Merz, 2025). As a result, Germany’s soon-to-be economically focused foreign policy could prioritize a Germany First stance over the last government’s Europe United.

An Effective Foreign Policy

An effective foreign policy is one that produces the desired result. To achieve this, Merz is convinced that organizational structures need to be adjusted. Therefore, he proposes a significant overhaul of Germany’s security architecture by establishing a new body: a National Security Council headquartered in the Chancellery. This council is designed to integrate and coordinate critical policy areas, creating a unified approach to decision-making. The concept of establishing a National Security Council in Germany is not novel. During negotiations over the national security strategy within the traffic light coalition, the formation of such a body was a central point of discussion. However, Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock were unable to reach a consensus on which ministry should oversee the council, leaving the proposal unresolved (Gebauer & Kormbaki, 2023). According to the CDU and CSU party manifesto, the National Security Council will serve as a central hub, seamlessly linking foreign, security, defense, trade, European, and development policy.

Once established, the National Security Council should be tasked with defining clear goals and crafting complementary strategies to serve as a blueprint for Germany’s foreign policy. According to the CDU chancellor candidate, the most significant flaw in past foreign policy has been the absence of a coherent strategy. He frequently cites the current Middle East policy as an example: while the Greens-led foreign ministry has communicated the goal of a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine, Merz not only disagrees with this objective but also criticizes the lack of a concrete strategy to achieve it. The new National Security Council, he argues, must set clear priorities, allocate necessary resources, and outline specific actions to ensure a unified and actionable approach across the entire government and with that, put an end to the former government’s approach of pursuing various avenues for the greater good (Friederichs, 2025).

In addition to tasking the National Security Council with priority setting, Merz has defined three key priorities for Germany’s foreign policy:

Restoring deterrence and defense capabilities

For Merz, this priority is guided by the realism-driven principle: “We want to be able to defend ourselves so that we do not have to defend ourselves” (Merz, 2025). In practice, this means investing in defense to increase strength, as “strength deters aggressors, and weakness invites aggressors” (Merz, 2025).

Strengthening national capacity to act and European sovereignty

The policies under this priority aim to overhaul both national and European defense procurement processes, striving to balance the dominance of Made in the USA with a robust Made in Europe approach—not only in quantity but also in quality (Merz, 2025). This shift seeks to strengthen Europe’s self-reliance and ensure that its defense capabilities are both competitive and cutting-edge.

Ending the Russian war against Ukraine

Despite his previously ambiguous stance on the extent to which this issue influences German arms exports, Merz has now unequivocally identified ending Russia’s war against Ukraine as a priority (Mayer, 2025). This position aligns closely with the communications of the former government, marking a notable convergence. However, while Merz emphasizes that peace must not come at the expense of Ukraine’s freedom, he has yet to articulate a clear vision of what a possible peace deal would entail. To safeguard Ukraine’s sovereignty, he advocates for providing comprehensive financial, military, diplomatic, and humanitarian support ensuring that the country has the resources necessary to defend itself and secure its future (Merz, 2025). On the third anniversary of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the day after the German elections, Merz also called for Kyiv’s participation in possible peace negotiations (Der Spiegel, 2025).

An Efficient Foreign Policy

An efficient foreign policy is one that achieves its objectives while optimizing the use of resources. Merz intends to apply this principle of efficiency to Germany’s defense policy. He has been critical of the European Defense Fund, arguing that it is not sufficiently expedient and therefore opposes its current framework. Instead, Merz advocates for a comprehensive reform of both national and European defense procurement processes to enhance the quantity and quality of defense capabilities. Specifically, he emphasizes the need to simplify, standardize, and scale up defense systems across Germany and Europe (Merz, 2025). While the European Defense Fund currently supports competitive and collaborative defense projects among member states, Merz contends that his proposed reforms would yield greater efficiency (European Commission, 2024). He further argues that any increase in defense spending should only occur after ensuring that resources are utilized effectively. Germany, in 2024, met its NATO commitment of allocating 2% of GDP to defense spending for the first time in decades, indicating that it is in fact necessary that Germany upholds its increased investments in the defense sector (Bartsch et al., 2024; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2022). The annual report by Dr. Eva Högl, the German Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, underscores the urgent need for increased funding for the Bundeswehr. She explicitly states that at least 300 billion euros are required to bring the German military to a sufficient level of readiness.

A CDU-led government would also tremendously impact Germany’s and Europe’s climate change policies. Acknowledging the threat posed by climate change, Merz has called for its integration into Germany’s national security strategy and stands by the overarching goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2045. However, influenced by his party’s strong opposition against the greens, he critiques the current discourse on climate change, arguing that it overly emphasizes the dangers while neglecting the opportunities it presents. He advocates for a more balanced discussion that highlights the potential for innovation and growth in addressing climate challenges (Merz, 2025). That said, Merz’s approach raises concerns about prioritization and feasibility. By framing climate change primarily as an opportunity for technological advancement, he risks downplaying the urgency of the crisis and the need for immediate, comprehensive action. His insistence on solving the climate crisis through innovation, rather than what he dismisses as ideological measures, appears to sideline proven policies like rapid renewable energy expansion and stricter emissions regulations. Furthermore, he has been sharply critical of the Traffic Light coalition’s decision to shut down Germany’s nuclear power plants during the energy crisis, calling it a "grave strategic mistake" that prioritized ideology over energy security (Steinlein, 2025). In response, he has called for a feasibility study to assess whether reactivating the decommissioned power plants is both technically viable and economically feasible. At the same time, his personal remarks about wind turbines being "aesthetically unpleasing" reveal a contradictory stance on clean energy (dpa, 2024). On a European level, Merz emphasizes the importance of advancing Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and Carbon Capture and Utilization (CCU) technologies as a unified effort within the European Union. While he champions technological innovation to combat climate change, his flirtation with nuclear power – while sidelining wind energy – raises doubts about his commitment to practical, immediate solutions. Cloaking his stance in the rhetoric of increased efficiency, he sidesteps the urgent need for sustainable and readily available alternatives.

As a prominent businessman, Friedrich Merz holds a firm position on German-China relations. The previous traffic light coalition pursued a derisking strategy, aiming to reduce Germany’s reliance on Chinese products. A CDU-led government would largely continue this approach, with one key distinction: German companies choosing to invest in the Chinese market would no longer receive state support in the event of financial losses (Merz, 2025). Through this decisive stance, Merz underscores the application of economic principles to foreign policy, reinforcing his commitment to business pragmatism.

A Transactional Foreign Policy

A transactional foreign policy prioritizes the immediate benefits nations can gain from interactions, often overlooking broader considerations. One week before Germany’s elections, J. D. Vance, the newly elected American Vice President, used his speech at the Munich Security Conference to accuse European countries of abandoning their values and ignoring voter concerns on migration and free speech (Inayatullah, 2025). He also criticized misinformation and disinformation, arguing that European governments were undermining their own democracies. The conference, intended to focus on ending the war in Ukraine and boosting European defense spending, instead highlighted the strained transatlantic relationship following Trump’s re-election. Vance’s speech and his bilateral meeting with Alice Weidel, Germany’s far-right chancellor candidate (who was not officially invited to the conference), sparked backlash from multiple politicians. They accused the Vice President of election interference. Merz, who also met with Vance during the event, shared these concerns.

Shortly after Trump’s inauguration, Merz expressed his view that the new U.S. administration presented an economic opportunity, particularly for advancing negotiations on a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (Merz, 2025). While he still stands by this, he however, in response to recent statements by President Trump, declared on election night that “it is evident the Americans, at least under this administration, are largely indifferent to the fate of Europe” (Nöstlinger & Ross, 2025; Verhelst, 2025). By doing so, he not only cast doubt on NATO’s effectiveness but also suggested that Europe may need to establish an entirely new defense framework to replace it (Nöstlinger & Ross, 2025). Last week, Friedrich Merz went as far as to advise that Germany should explore the possibility of forming a European nuclear umbrella in collaboration with France and Britain, as a potential alternative to relying on U.S. nuclear security guarantees (Adler, 2025). This shift from economic opportunism to pragmatic independence underscores the transactional nature of his foreign policy: if a counterpart proves beneficial, he engages; if not, he distances himself.

This shift marks a notable evolution in his stance on the EU’s significance. Throughout his election campaign, Merz positioned himself as a pro-EU candidate, consistently emphasizing the importance of trade within the European Union and advocating for a more liberal economic approach. He has been a vocal proponent of an EU-Mercosur free trade agreement, insisting that it should focus exclusively on trade promotion. Additionally, Merz has called for the repeal of the EU Supply Chain Law and the postponement of CSRD reporting obligations, arguing that these measures hinder investment in critical economic sectors. Within the EU, he has pushed to move beyond the rigid dichotomy of being fully inside or outside the bloc, instead advocating for expanded trade agreements with European partners outside the EU (Merz, 2025). However, following Trump’s criticism of Europe and the stain this had on the transatlantic relationship, Merz identified a leadership vacuum in Europe and has since sought to position himself as a contender to fill that void (Nöstlinger & Ross, 2025). Yet, by relegating the EU’s role as a value union to a secondary priority, Merz risks undermining the democratic and collaborative principles that form the foundation of the European project. By prioritizing economic interests and self-promotion over the reinforcement of value-based alliances, his foreign policy reveals a distinctly transactional and pragmatic approach, sparking concerns about the potential erosion of the EU’s long-term cohesion and foundational integrity.

Similarly, Merz’s approach to development aid prioritizes economic and political gains over genuine humanitarian or developmental goals. By urging German businesses to invest in Africa, he frames development as a tool for economic expansion rather than a commitment to reducing inequality or fostering sustainable growth. Moreover, his condition of tying development aid to the repatriation of refugees underscores a quid-pro-quo mentality, where assistance is contingent on compliance with Germany’s domestic priorities. This approach risks undermining the principles of solidarity and cooperation, reducing development aid to a bargaining chip in a broader political and economic negotiation (Merz, 2025). In general, his shift toward a more pragmatic, trade-focused agenda highlights a foreign policy driven by economic gains rather than a commitment to shared values or deeper integration.

Where did the values go?

Under Merz’s vision, foreign policy is reduced to a strategic framework where principles take a backseat to pragmatism – with a few exceptions: Israel’s needs are prioritized unconditionally, justified by raison d’état, and domestically, a zero-tolerance policy against supporting terrorist organizations is enforced through harsh measures like deportation, revocation of residence permits, and loss of German citizenship (Merz, 2025). His approach to foreign policy claims to reject moral lecturing, but in reality it elevates transaction, effectiveness, and efficiency above ethical considerations. While Merz seeks to restore the trust of global partners and allies through a foreign policy driven by German interests, which may take precedence over EU priorities, he simultaneously portrays the EU as a shared space of values and culture worth defending (Merz, 2025). Yet, his goal of transforming Germany from a "sleeping middle power to a leading middle power" raises a critical question: how can Germany lead without a clear moral compass or values to guide its actions?

Conclusion

The erosion of value-based politics is a growing trend globally, as seen in the West’s willingness to overlook democratic backsliding in countries like India for the sake of strategic partnerships, or Sweden’s abandonment of its feminist foreign policy in favor of more pragmatic approaches. Merz’s foreign policy aligns with this shift, prioritizing transactional gains over moral principles (Walfridsson, 2022). By conditioning development aid on refugee repatriation, sidelining EU values for trade agreements, and focusing on efficiency and effectiveness over ethical considerations, Merz exemplifies a broader move away from value-driven diplomacy. While this pragmatic approach may yield short-term benefits, it risks undermining Germany’s moral authority and long-term credibility as a leader on the global stage. Without a foundation of values, Germany’s ambition to transition from a "sleeping middle power to a leading middle power" risks falling short. Signaling a Germany First approach does not inspire others to follow; instead, it risks triggering a wave of diplomatic disengagement, as nations prioritize their own interests over collective cooperation. In the absence of shared principles and trust, there will be little left to lead, leaving Germany’s role in shaping a just and equitable world increasingly uncertain and fragmented.

References

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